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ABSTRACT: The past years has seen a dramatic rise in the contestation of the European Union and its policies. 
This article seeks to understand this rise as a result of the way in which we ‘do’ integration. This method, which 
heavily relies on the use of law to prevent the creation of negative externalities among the Member States, has 
increasingly limited the scope for political self-determination within and between the Member States. The 
ensuing contestation, it is argued, cannot solely be resolved by re-assessing the role of law in the process of 
integration, but requires a significant institutional reconfiguration as well.   
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I. Introduction 
 
This history of European integration has been a history of structuring ties of interdependence 
between Member States. This interdependence between states is at once the problem that the 
integration process attempts to solve and its very purpose – the end of integration.1 The 
ambiguous relationship between interdependence and integration explains, it will be argued, 
both the nature of the integration process as well as the increase in contestation that it has 
engendered in the past decades.  
 
At the start of the process of European integration, interdependence between states in specific 
policy areas was primarily understood as something that could prevent the imposition of costs 
between neighbouring states – be it in economic, social or military terms. On this account, a 
range of institutional innovations, on both the national and supranational level, were meant to 
create the preconditions for a stable relationship of interdependence between states. This 
consisted, on the one hand, of an institutional structure that allowed for collective decision-
making, thereby solidifying existing ties of interdependence and internalising the imposition 
of costs between Member States. On the other hand, it was based on a very specific role for 
law – which became an integrative force in and of itself. On this view, the authority of the EU 
legal order is explicitly justified with reference to its potential to manage the interdependence 
between Member States. In the last decades of integration, the interdependence between 
Member States has been extended to politically salient areas such as migration and budgetary 
politics, with an increasing need for law to stabilise the ensuing complexity (part II).  
 
The history of European integration has also been a history of ever greater contestation of the 
EU’s authority. Properly understood, this contestation centres on what the EU does, rather 
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than the EU in itself. The main sites where such contestation has emerged – ranging from 
distributive politics to differentiated integration and Brexit – have one thing in common. In 
these domains, the EU struggles to legitimise its policy orientation because it uses law to 
constrain domestic political mandates. In this fashion, EU law keeps generating sites of 
conflict and resistance throughout the policy domains that it engages with. The use of law as 
an instrument to tie Member States to the common project and prevent the imposition of costs 
between them, in other words, destabilises rather than stabilises the project of integration. 
Crucially, the EU increasingly struggles to articulate a way to productively institutionalise this 
contestation and the ensuing political conflict (part III). 
 
These two stories of European integration suggest that if we want to analyse the EU’s current 
predicament, and think of ways to overcome it, we ought to think of ways in which the EU 
can become more sensitive to instances of contestation. The question that is crucial to the 
legitimacy of the EU, then, has changed from 1957. If in 1957 the question was how to 
manage interdependence between Member States; the question today is how to manage 
contestation in conditions of interdependence.
2
 Some commentators have suggested that the 
answer lies in the use of law. What we ought to aim for, in other words, is contestation 
through law. The logic, here, is that the process of integration through law can only be 
meaningfully resisted by judicial actors on the national level. Other commentators have 
suggested that what we need is not contestation through law, but contestation of law. This 
solution focuses on the re-assertion of the primacy of politics over law. The way in which this 
ought to happen is disputed. While some commentators suggest that the Council is the most 
appropriate site for ‘taking back control’, others have suggested that national parliaments or 
national electorates ought to be in the driving seat.  
 
This contribution suggests that the twin processes of interdependence and contestation 
demand that we move away from such solutions. On the one hand, contestation in conditions 
of interdependence requires decisions to be taken beyond the level of the nation state. After 
all, national decisions affect citizens in other states that have not been consulted on the choice. 
On the other hand, contestation in a situation of interdependence requires the process through 
which decisions are taken to be sensitive to substantive policy claims. Strengthening the hold 
of institutions that represent national interests over the course of integration achieves the 
opposite: rather than allowing citizens to contest and control the direction of the integration 
process, it creates even more need for legal constraints on national decisions, justified in order 
to manage their external effects (part IV). 
 
This contribution calls for a re-imagination of how we ‘do’ integration in a way that allows 
the EU to be sensitive to its own limits. This would require a simultaneous concern with 
structuring ties of interdependence across borders as well as with the contestation or 
resistance that the management of these ties engender. In the long term, widespread 
contestation of the EU be prevented only by creating a space for contestation within the EU. 
 
 
II: Institutionalising Interdependence 
 
The conceptual puzzle that undergirds much of EU law is the puzzle of interdependence. In a 
sense, interdependence is the constructive translation of the destruction brought about by the 
two world wars. It takes as given the tendency of Europe’s powers to create significant costs 
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on their neighbours, be it in economic, social, or military terms. The immediate preoccupation 
for most European states, after the Second World War, then, was to create a structure through 
which these costs could be prevented – or at least anticipated and mediated. The process of 
European integration can be seen as such a structure. It seeks – in different, and arguably 
contradictory ways – to prevent, anticipate and mediate in conflicts among its Member States 
that are generated where one state’s internal decision imposes an external cost on its 
neighbour. Confusingly, one of the solutions to the problem of interdependence has been the 
perpetuation of interdependence – the logic being that once nation states are inextricably tied 
to each other, economic or military conflict becomes an exercise in self-harm, and, thereby, 
extremely unlikely. This interaction between the negative side to interdependence (which 
understands it as a problem, in so far as it allows states to impose costs on each other) and the 
positive side to interdependence (which understands interdependence as the solution and 
starting point towards more peaceful relations between states) has been central to the 
integration process – and can explicitly be traced in the Schumann declaration.3  
 
From the start of the integration process, then, a central question has been how to manage the 
interdependence between states. What makes the different options to achieve this more or less 
attractive is not only their capacity to instantiate ties of interdependence, and to prevent the 
imposition of costs by states on neighbouring states; but also their capacity to do so in a way 
that respects each state’s independence, sovereignty, or autonomy. This is the problem that 
the European project has grappled with from the start, and has come back with a vengeance 
after the Euro-crisis, refugee crisis, and Brexit: how to institutionalise the tension between, on 
the one hand, the interdependence between states, and, on the other hand, the independence of 
states.
4
 
 
At the core of this tension – that is central to the legitimacy of the EU – lies the principle of 
congruence. This principle is firmly rooted in democratic theory, and suggests that democratic 
authority is to a large extent premised on the approximation (or congruence) between those 
making a decision and those affected by that decision, that is, between the objects and 
subjects of rule.
5
 We may think it is inappropriate if Member State A builds a fossil fuel 
factory on the border with Member State B, with the prevailing winds carrying any pollution 
into the territory of Member State B. This allows Member State A to reap the benefits of its 
decision while externalising the costs onto Member State B. Member State B, on the other 
hand, is faced with the costs while not having access to the associated benefits. At the same 
time, this example loses much of its problematic nature if the citizens of Member State B 
democratically accept the decision of Member State A, or are compensated for it by having 
access to Member State A’s energy supplies. What lies at the core of the principle of 
congruence, then, is that the legitimacy of a decision requires a link between those making a 
decision and those affected by it.
6
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functions, too. Beyond the evident representative element, the principle of congruence also serves to internalise 
dissent, mediate conflict, and legitimise any coercive action taken in the implementation of a certain decision. 
6
 GOODIN, Enfranchising All Affected Interests, cit. 5, 51; DAHL After the Revolution, cit 5, 64. 
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There is, of course, an evident conceptual blindspot to the principle of congruence or affect: 
the question who ought to be involved in making a decision is conditional upon the 
substantive outcome of that same decision.
7
 In other words: if the citizens in Member State A 
vote in favour of building a fossil fuel factory on the border with Member State B, the citizens 
of the Member State B ought to have been involved in making that decision. If, on the other 
hand, the citizens of Member State A decide not to build the reactor, the citizens of Member 
State B do not need to be involved. If we take the principle of congruence to its logical 
extreme, the personal scope of decision-making changes depending on the nature of the policy 
question and the specific answer to every question.  
 
Traditionally, this blindspot has been overcome by the use of proxies. As Goodin highlights, 
geographical proximity and the ethno-historical alliances that have cyrstallised into bounded 
political communities are used as shortcuts. The assumption, here, is that choices made by 
individuals or groups that live in close proximity, or that are historically intertwined, are 
likely to affect fellow members of that group.
8
 The institutional machinery of the nation state 
has served to solidify these shortcuts. At the same time, these proxies have always been 
unstable, as the perpetual wars and shifting borders in Europe highlight. More importantly, 
they have always remained proxies. As Goodin puts it, “constituting a demos on the basis of 
shared territory or history or nationality is thus only an approximation to constituting it on the 
basis of what really matters, which is interlinking interests”.9 In the past decades, the use of 
the nation state as a proxy for congruence looks increasingly anachronistic. The advent of the 
internet, the technological ease of communication, travel, and business has massively 
increased the capacity of states at other ends of the world to impose costs on each other. 
Russia has been accused of meddling in US elections through hacking; the UK threatens the 
EU by slashing its corporate tax rates after Brexit; the US’ decision to withdraw from the 
Paris Agreement will have an effect on living conditions in Bangladesh; Facebook’s global 
privacy settings are dictated by litigation brought in Ireland by an Austrian activist; a war in 
Syria brings European politics close to collapse; and rating agencies in New York affect the 
life of pensioners in Greece. All these examples suggest, at the very least, that the spatial unit 
of the nation state is increasingly unable to remain committed to the principle of congruence – 
which requires approximation between those making a decision and those affected by it.
10
  
 
This is most clearly felt if we turn the principle of congruence on its head. After all, it is not 
only about ensuring the approximation between those making a decision and those affected by 
it; but also requires that those that are affected by a decision ought to be able to change it. 
This shows how far we are removed from meeting the principle of congruence today. It also 
explains the purchase of the political narrative of ‘taking back control’ that is emerging in 
many western countries, as well as, ironically, its impossible realisation on the national level. 
At the same time, focusing on the notion that those affected by a decision should have the 
capacity to alter it (‘taking back control’) serves to open up space and imagination towards 
novel ways of achieving it. It leads us in the direction of an idea of congruence that focuses on 
the active agency of a community of affected individuals, rather than a managerial approach 
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8
 GOODIN, Enfranchising All Affected Interests, cit 5, 48. 
9
 GOODIN, Enfranchising All Affected Interests, cit 5, 49. 
10
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that constrains the capacity of groups of citizens or states to make decisions that affect 
outsiders. 
 
This section traces how the EU understands the principle of congruence. It does so by 
disentangling the different understandings of interdependence that are implicit in the 
functioning of the EU. It suggests that, originally, the scope and nature of the ties of 
interdependence between Member States was managed by creating transnational forums for 
decision-making and for the enforcement of those decisions. In such a setting, congruence is 
secured by enhancing the reference group for the making of the type of decisions that are 
likely to affect others (section 1). Law plays an important role in this solution. The notion of 
‘integration through law’, wherein legal principles serve to constrain the capacity of Member 
States to go back on its commitments or impose costs on its neighbours, has become the 
central instrument for the management of interdependence between states. On this view, 
congruence is secured by preventing the imposition of costs among states (section 2). The last 
decades of integration have seen a move towards creating interdependence between Member 
States in some of the most salient policy domains – ranging from immigration control to fiscal 
policies – which makes securing the principle of congruence increasingly complex. Legal 
constraints now operate in fields that were previously considered the bread and butter of 
domestic politics (section 3). As the following section will highlight, this move has led to a 
significant increase in contestation of the EU.  
 
II.1 – The institutions of interdependence 
 
The solution to interdependence that the original EEC Treaty suggested rested on the pooling 
of sovereignty, with the management of certain policy areas being transferred to the level 
beyond the state. As such, the creation of a range of novel institutions, such as the European 
Commission, the Court of Justice, and the Parliamentary Assembly served to aid the process 
through which states – now formally meeting as part of the Council – would make collective 
decisions, the enforcement of which would be delegated to impartial and apolitical 
institutions. Interdependence, and the impossibility of state decisions to impose costs on its 
neighbours, then, was secured by insisting that certain types of decisions that had this 
potential were taken collectively on the European level. This also explains why integration 
was primarily limited to policy domains where the risk of cross-border externalities were 
considered to be the highest, and where cooperation therefore offered the biggest potential to 
inextricably link Member States (such as coal, steel, and the production and distribution of 
food). Conversely, policy areas that were considered to impose few costs across borders, or 
where cooperation was unlikely to structurally link Member States’ together, such as welfare 
policies, were left on the national level.
11
  
 
The EU’s institutional structure, on this view, was meant to create the preconditions for a 
stable relationship of interdependence between Member States. Joint decision-making in 
Brussels, and constrained capacity of policy options at home, then, would prevent and 
institutionalise conflict and cost-attribution across borders. The joint exercise of state power 
would simultaneously safeguard Member State power and eviscerate its potential to impose 
costs on others.
12
 At the most basic level this is, of course, still a central part of the EU’s 
functioning. Standardisation or harmonisation of Member State rules is nothing more than an 
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 See e.g. S. GIUBBONI, Social Right and Market Freedom in the European Constitution (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) 29 and J. RUGGIE, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: 
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order (1982) 36 International Organization 379.  
12
 A. MILWARD, The European Rescue of the Nation State (Abingdon: Routledge, 2000) 3. 
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expression of state power in a way that prevents (or at least internalises) the uneven 
imposition of costs between those states. Congruence, in such a model, is secured by scaling 
up the reference group for the making of decisions: if all decisions are taken jointly, the 
uneven imposition of costs and benefits is automatically mediated. The upshot of this method 
is that it also captures the more positive understanding of interdependence, which sees 
interdependence as a solution rather than a problem. On this view, the creation of an 
institutional structure for collective co-decision would make Member States structurally 
sensitive to each other’s needs, prevent the gratuitous use of vetoes, socialise its members, 
gradually entangle their economic interests, and lead to the articulation of shared or collective 
values across the Member States. In such a setting, waging war would, to use Schumann’s 
words, be “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible”. The obsession of academics 
and politicians with the idea of a European identity stems from this mode of ‘doing’ 
integration: as something that would simultaneously result from the creation of collective 
institutions and further galvanise their effectiveness.  
 
In the initial phase of integration, then, interdependence was structured by scaling up the level 
of decision-making of the type of decisions that were considered to lead to costs between 
neighbouring states. The problem with this approach is, of course, that it perpetuates the very 
problem that it is meant to solve. Joint decisions on the European level, after all, remain 
conditional upon the acquiescence of each individual state. The two main crisis of the early 
decades of integration – the collapse of the proposed European Defence Community and the 
‘empty chair’ crisis, whereby De Gaulle refused to participate in Council discussions – 
indicate this point well: domestic opposition in one Member State could stop the whole 
process.
13
 Rather than solving conceptually the problem of how states could affect the 
interests of others, then, the earliest days of integration focused on institutionalising this 
potential. This is not to say that it failed in its objective: the secondary effects of socialisation 
and cooperation cannot be underestimated, nor can the move to qualified majority voting 
(with its potential to sidestep this type of institutional paralysis) be explained without it.
14
  
 
II.2 – Interdependence through law? 
 
The introduction to the Commission’s 2017 ‘White Paper on the Future of the EU’ highlights 
another way to structure the interdependence between states. It reads: “Sixty years ago, 
inspired by that dream of a peaceful, shared future, the EU’s founding members (…) agreed to 
settle their conflicts around the table rather than in battlefields. They replaced the use of 
armed forces by the force of law.”15 This story is one that EU lawyers are familiar with. It is 
the story of integration through law, which, essentially, describes how law has become the 
instrument through which interdependence between States is stabilised. Properly understood, 
this ‘integration through law’ is a complement to the institutional solution outlined in the 
previous section rather than a substitute. The doctrines of direct effect and supremacy, on this 
view, serve to prevent ‘selective exit’ by Member States that attempt to go back on their 
commitments towards integration,
16
 or that attempt to impose costs on their neighbours. Such 
behaviour becomes legally impossible. Securing congruence, in other words, is 
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 R. DWAN, Jean Monnet and the European Defence Community 1950-54 (2001)1 Cold War History 141. 
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 Thanks for Niamh Dunne for pointing this out.  
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 White Paper on the Future of the EU: Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025 COM (2017) 2025, 6. 
Emphasis added. See also L. AZOULAI, ‘Integration through law’ and us (2016) ICON 450.  
16
 J. WEILER, The Transformation of Europe (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2412. 
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simultaneously the justification for, and the objective of, the particular nature of the EU’s 
legal order.
17
 
 
The starting point for this story are the rulings by the Court in Van Gend & Loos and Costa v 
ENEL.
18
 In creating the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy, the Court altered the 
relationship between law and politics in the process of integration.
19
 The legal norms in the 
Treaty – primarily the free movement provisions – became directly applicable within 
domestic legal orders, and automatically displaced conflicting national norms.
20
 This ‘new 
legal order’ that is created, then, understands law to be both the object and agent of 
integration.
21
 The justification for this particular role of law is that it can successfully manage 
interdependence between states by insulating its central norms from political contestation on 
the national level, and by constraining the capacity of states to make choices that impose costs 
on their neighbours.
22
  
 
This is best explained with reference to the free movement provisions. These provisions 
guarantee the free circulation of goods, services, capital, workers, and, more recently, citizens. 
National decisions, even if democratically legitimated, that prevent such circulation – whether 
by the imposition of discriminatory rules or indistinctly applicable rules that limit market 
access – are illegal under EU law, and are declared inapplicable.23 This structure clearly 
hamstrings the capacity of national political actors to determine policy outcomes, allowing 
only those choices that are sufficiently sensitive to the interests of outside actors. And that is 
exactly the point of the free movement provisions, of course: to secure congruence by making 
domestic political choices sensitive to the interests of outsiders that are affected by those 
choices. As Azoulai has put it, the free movement provisions “help the Member States to 
“recontextualise” the decision-making process at national level to force them to take account 
of interests coming from or situations in other Member States, which are not only interests of 
firms but also of citizens, workers or students.”24 Even more explicitly, AG Maduro’s opinion 
in CEZ highlights that the interpretation of the free movement provisions ought to be “guided 
by the goal of making national authorities, insofar as is possible, attentive to the impact of 
their decisions on the interests of other Member States and their citizens since that goal can be 
said to be at the core of the project of European integration and to be embedded in its rules”.25 
The role of law, then, in the EU, is to manage interdependence by simply making certain 
domestic policy choices legally unavailable.  
 
This centrality of law as the instrument to manage interdependence and secure congruence 
comes with a number of assumptions about law, the most crucial of which is that it can 
somehow replace politics. Not only does it suggest that law can replace politics for the 
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24
 L. AZOULAI, The Court of Justice and the Social Market Economy: The Emergence of an Ideal and the Conditions 
for its Realisation (2008) 45 CMLR, 1342-3. 
25
 Opinion of AG Maduro in Case C-115/08, CEZ EU:C:2009:660, para. 1 and 23.  
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purpose of managing interdependence between states – in so far political agreement on the 
European level is no longer necessary to push forward integration; but also that the use of law 
in and of itself can somehow stabilise that process integration. As Azoulai puts it, “this vision 
presented law not only as a functional tool but as a cultural or symbolic form, as a carrier of a 
new spirit of cooperation and solidarity, and as a medium capable of containing political, 
economic and social forces, as well as the cement capable of holding these divergent forces 
together”. 26  More than that, law is understood as being able to “stabilise expectations, 
command authority, institutionalise certain values, resolve differences and communicate 
collective decisions to all parts of society”,27 in particular because EU law is enforced through 
domestic judicial and administrative actors, which are imbued with a degree of social 
authority that derives from the domestic constitutional settlement.
28
 As we will see below, this 
depoliticised and depoliticising nature of EU law becomes more problematic once 
contestation emerges around the values that it articulates.
29
 
 
Integration through law, then, sees to the construction of a new order that takes its authority 
from the successful construction and management of interdependence.
30
 Or, to put it another 
way, the reason why we need EU law to be so powerful is simultaneously to tie Member 
States to their common ambitions, and to manage the complex structures of interdependence 
that exist between states. Only by significantly constraining the room for manoeuvre of 
national political actors can EU law ensure that they do not take decisions that impose costs 
on other states, their citizens or companies.  
 
At the same time, the story of integration through law is only partially committed to the idea 
of congruence. While its authority derives from the fact that it prevents a decision of State A 
that does not comply with the collectively-agreed rules or that imposes costs on State B; it is 
not capable, in and of itself, of articulating a more positive or active understanding of 
congruence whereby those citizens that are affected by a certain decision are also able to 
change it. For the latter, the institutional route discussed in the previous section remains 
crucial. Problematically, however, the constraints that exist on legislative action by the EU 
institutions – ranging from high majority tresholds, joint-decision traps and limited 
competences to inertia and unbridgeable differences in political economy between the 
Member States
31
 – mean that EU law often operates in isolation from its institutional 
component. This has led to an often-rehearsed critique that the way in which integration takes 
place – wherein legal constraints rather than political preferences dominate the EU’s policy 
orientation – leads to problems of legitimacy for the Union.32 
 
II.3 – 1992-2019: Ever further interdependence 
 
                                                        
26
 AZOULAI, ‘Integration through Law’ and Us, cit. 15, 450. 
27
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 See below section 2. 
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31
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Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).  
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Around the time of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), the web of interdependence at the centre 
of the integration project becomes even more intricate. While integration before 1992 focused 
mainly on low-salience and regulatory policies; in 1992 it moves into high-salience, 
redistributive and politically contested policy domains. The perpetuation of ever further 
interdependence between Member States in these areas – which include those most central to 
a state’s sovereignty, such as monetary and border policies – creates a problem for its 
management. While EU law has been central in this management, it increasingly operates in 
isolation from the institutional process that was meant to ensure congruence in the 
management of the ties of interdependence. In consequence, as we will see in the next section, 
EU law increasingly struggles to legitimately settle high-salience policy questions. 
 
The two policy domains in which this escalation of interdependence is clearest are Schengen 
and the creation of the EMU. Both, of course, carry significant advantages for the integration 
process, such as the decrease of transaction costs and administrative burdens, as well as being 
symbolic markers for the progress of the process of integration. What is clear, in both policy 
domains, however, is that the increase in inter-state interdependence is significant. Once a 
single monetary policy is agreed, after all, Member States become interdependent in welfare 
policy, labour and employment policy, and fiscal policy. The decision of the Greek 
government to offer holiday payments to Greek pensioners, for example, appears to have such 
an impact on Finnish fiscal sustainability that judicial constraints on the former are justified 
with reference to the latter. These interdependencies are created by the decision to have a 
single monetary policy. They are not a pre-existing interdependence that requires 
management to secure peaceful cooperation between states, but a constructed one. The very 
decision to launch the EMU, in fact, was explicitly justified with reference to need to 
institutionalise and contain the economic potential of a reunified Germany and its D-mark.
33
 
Once again, this shows the ambivalent link between interdependence and the process of 
integration: it is perceived as the very purpose of integration, but also as a problem that 
requires careful management.  
 
The Schengen agreement can be understood in similar terms. It is clear that without internal 
borders, Member States become interdependent in domains as diverse as asylum, terrorism 
prevention, criminal law or the enforcement of judicial and administrative decisions. A 
decision by Spain, for example, to open its borders in Ceuta and Melilla, or not extradite a 
certain criminal, might lead to the collapse of, say, the Dutch government. And, once again, 
judicial constraints on the former are justified with reference to the need to prevent the latter. 
These complex webs of interdependence do not necessarily exist by virtue of the close 
geographical proximity between Member States. They have been created by a deliberate 
decision to abolish internal borders between the Member States that participate in Schengen. 
The Schengen Agreement is premised partially on the desire by the participating Member 
States to “strengthen the solidarity between their people”.34 As Durkheim had already noticed, 
creating complex webs of interdependence is the most effective way of generating a sense of 
organic solidarity.
35
 It might be a stretch to suggest that the Schengen agreement had the 
explicit purpose of strengthening the interdependence between the Member States. At the 
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same time, it cannot be underestimated how close the symbolic narrative of Schengen, 
especially when tied to the simultaneous emergence of EU citizenship, comes to that vision. 
 
What has typified the development of the Schengen area, the scope of Union citizenship, and 
the EMU ever since its inception is the reliance on law to secure its smooth functioning. As 
legislative action by the EU in these areas was thought to be politically too divisive (or legally 
constrained with reference to domestic constitutional guarantees) core questions related to the 
management of, say, the welfare state, fiscal policies, criminal law, or law enforcement were 
left on the national level. Instead, the increase in interdependence between Member States is 
stabilised by constraining the type of decisions that Member States are allowed to take in 
these areas. EU law serves to constrain national policy autonomy so that domestic decisions 
conform to the standards and principles that govern the EU’s policy. The stability and growth 
pact or Dublin Regulation serve, on this view, the same purpose: to ensure that Member 
States’ domestic policy choices do not impose costs on its neighbouring states.  
 
This indicates how the pursuit of congruence becomes ever more skewed in the EU: the 
exercise of law, which constraints national policy choices with reference to the need to 
prevent the imposition of costs on neighbouring states, is no longer accompanied by its 
institutional component, which serves to ensure that all those affected by a policy decision get 
to have a voice in creating it.
 36
 The way in which the Euro-crisis has been ‘solved’ is 
indicative of this – the six-pack, the golden budget rule, the stability and growth pact, the 
prescriptive mandate for the ECB, and the codification of the ban on haircuts, and the 
constitutionalisation of austerity in Pringle are all examples of the reliance on law in the 
management of possible externalities generated by the creation of the EMU. Crucially, this 
depoliticising role for EU law has been explicitly justified with reference to its capacity to 
prevent Member States from imposing costs on each other. To the extent that political 
institutions have played a role in adopting these rules, it is clear that Treaty provisions on the 
equality between states, on the substantive constraints imposed by the competence catalogue, 
and on the involvement of representative institutions have been stretched beyond 
recognition.
37
 All this leads to a problem in the pursuit of congruence. More and more often, 
EU law imposes constraints on national policy choices that Member States are unable to resist 
even when their democratic mandate suggests that they should.
38
 
 
The evolution of the integration process since 1992 makes the assessment of the state of 
interdependence in the EU even more muddled and ambivalent. In the first decades of 
integration the principle of congruence was more or less protected by the combination of, on 
the one hand, an institutional structure through which all affected Member States could 
articulate their views on a policy question, and, on the other hand, a legal order that secured 
compliance with the agreed policy orientation and made unavailable those domestic policy 
choices that imposed costs on neighbouring states.
39
 Over the course of the process of 
integration, and as more and more interdependence between Member States was created in 
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high-salient policy fields, this balance has been gradually lost. Given that legislative action in 
these areas is legally or politically difficult and heavily contested, the EU has increasingly 
secured congruence through the use of law. The use of law, here, is justified with reference to 
the need to stabilise the interdependent relationship between states.
40
 Crucially, however, it 
also exacerbates the partial commitment to the principle of congruence that is implicit in the 
very nature of EU law. EU law is successful in preventing the imposition of costs by one state 
on another by constraining domestic rules on taxation, border controls, environmental policy 
or domestic budgets. At the same time, EU law is structurally incapable of articulating or 
institutionalising the more active component of the principle of congruence, which suggests 
that all that are affected by a certain decision ought to be able to change that decision.  
 
 
III: Institutionalising Contestation 
 
The history of the European integration process is not only a story of ever closer 
interdependence. It is also indisputably a history of ever increasing contestation. Until the 
early 2000s, integration had famously been described as premised on a ‘permissive 
consensus’ among the EU’s electorates about the nature, direction, and organisation of the 
EU.
41
 The period since the early 2000s has seen the emergence of numerous sites of conflict 
and resistance to the EU – which range from problematizing specific policy orientations or 
institutions, to all-out rejections of its very existence. Such contestation comes from political 
and judicial actors alike, has emerged in each Member States (if in different forms), from all 
sides of the political spectrum, and in almost all policy areas that the EU engages with. The 
last decades, in other words, have turned the ‘permissive consensus’ into a ‘constraining 
dissensus’.42  
 
My argument, in this paper, is that the story of interdependence and the story of contestation 
are closely linked. Simply put, the increasing contestation of the EU and its policies can be 
traced back to how we ‘do’ integration, and particularly the reliance on law. EU law is, as we 
will see below, structurally unable to internalise and institutionalise contestation as to the 
substantive norms and values that it articulates. This means that EU law struggles to 
legitimise those norms and values. This structural inability to internalise contestation points 
towards a wider and more conceptual problem, whereby the distance between those affected 
by EU law norms and those able to alter them has increased exponentially over the past 
decades. Empirical work, for example, seems to suggest much more resistance against what 
the EU is doing than against the EU as such.
43
 For domestic electorates, however, changing 
what the EU does is much more difficult that simply leaving the EU. This premise lies at the 
very core of the EU’s current crisis, and is best unpacked by looking at the diverse sites where 
contestation of the EU has emerged.  
 
This section highlights different sites of contestation in the EU, and traces this contestation 
back to the predominant use of EU law in securing congruence and stabilising 
interdependence between states. The problem with this approach to the management of 
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interdependence is that it does not leave sufficient space for the more active component of the 
principle of congruence, which focuses on the need for those affected to be able to change a 
decision. First, contestation has emerged where EU law tries to make sense of redistributive 
questions. This can be seen in the context of the free movement – think of the contestation of 
the conditions under which migrants can access welfare benefits in their host state – but also 
in the context of the Euro-crisis (section 1). The second site of contestation is where EU law 
balances between individual rights and collective public policy norms – which is aimed at the 
conceptual and normative centrality of the individual in the nature of EU law (section 2). The 
third site of contestation that has emerged is where the EU’s norms are perceived to lead to 
identity costs on the national level. This can be traced in the refugee crisis, and, perhaps more 
structurally, in the process of differentiated integration (section 3). Brexit, finally, can be 
understood is the re-articulation of contestation of particular values or norms of EU law in a 
much more explosive format. The rejection of the whole edifice of integration is the logical 
conclusion of the processes discussed above. Without possibility to contest what the EU does, 
the only alternative form of contestation becomes the contestation of what the EU is (section 
4).  
 
If the purpose of European integration, as discussed above, is to structure the ties of 
interdependence between Member States, EU law is increasingly unable to deliver this. If 
anything, EU law’s tendency to articulate a type of society, citizen, and polity that it considers 
appropriate continues to generate sites of conflict and resistance throughout the policy 
domains that it engages with.
44
 Such conflict about the values or norms that a polity 
articulates is not problematic per se. However, to translate substantive policy contestation into 
a productive and legitimating force, any polity requires a sophisticated institutional structure 
that can internalise such claims and make sense of them. What we see in the EU, instead, is 
the realisation that the management of interdependence does not stabilise but destabilises the 
process of integration. The reason for this is a complete disregard to the more active 
component of the principle of congruence: whereby those affected by a decision ought to be 
able to alter that decision. 
 
III.1 – Beyond the regulatory polity 
 
The first site where major conflict and contestation emerges in the EU is where it 
redistributes. This takes place across its policies, but is most explicit in the austerity drive that 
has followed the Euro-crisis and in the controversy surrounding access to welfare benefits for 
intra-EU migrants in the host state. In both areas, contestation is articulated in terms of 
justice. Should Greek hospitals have their budgets slashed in order to repay banks in creditor 
states? Should an economically inactive Belgian national have access to basic subsistence 
allowances if he has lived in Poland for three years? The answers to these questions differ 
from person to person – as they are based on moral or intuitive sensitivities for equality, 
desert, and need. Such differences exist within and across polities. The difference is that 
within polities, sophisticated institutional machineries exist that can collect the individuals’ 
answers, mediate between them, and legitimise the redistributive outcome. On the European 
level, all prerequisites for such institutional machinery are currently lacking. Instead, 
redistributive choices in the EU are primarily legitimised through law.  
 
The rights that a migrant EU citizen has in her host state, for example, are solely determined 
by the Court’s interpretation of Directive 2004/38, the conditions of ‘real link’, ‘degree of 
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integration’ and the length of economic activity. 45  The austerity conditions imposed on 
financially struggling Member States are negotiated politically, but in such a rigid legal 
framework that any choice but austerity is in fact considered illegal under EU law. The 
constitutionalisation of austerity by the Court in Pringle and OMT allows statements such as 
Schäuble’s quip that debt relief for Greece is illegal under EU law and German constitutional 
law.
46
 Contestation about these values – about the appropriate division of resources in society 
– in other words, has no place in the EU polity and cannot be internalised within its 
institutional structure.  
 
What follows is a legitimacy problem. When faced with openly redistributive questions, EU 
law relies on its trusted method of legally enshrining policy orientations. This tactic is 
predominant throughout the EU’s policy domains. As Davies and Bartl highlight, the 
justification for legislative action from the side of the EU is its capacity to attain highly 
prescribed functional objectives, such as abolishing barriers to trade or securing free 
competition.
47
 This level of functional prescription serves to do two things at once. On the one 
hand, it prevents the capacity of states to impose costs on its neighbours, as domestic 
decisions that go against these functional objectives are illegal. On the other hand, it prevents 
dissent, and makes those functional objectives uncontestable.
48
 Once the EU moves beyond 
these clearly defined regulatory or functional objectives, however, it struggles to source 
authority for its policy choices – as a consequence of its operation in isolation from 
sophisticated political processes that can institutionalise the clash of competing claims.
49
 The 
EU is unable to internalise the struggle, mutually incompatible claims, and coercive authority 
that typifies redistributive questions.
50
 What follows, instead, is redistribution without 
politicisation, premised on a deeply unstable use of EU law.  
 
III.2 – Beyond the individual 
 
The second site where contestation of the EU has emerged is where it tries to balance 
individual with collective values. It struggles to do so appropriately – or at least legitimately – 
because of the way in which EU law operates. The EU’s legal authority, as many scholars 
have argued, is premised on the creation of a range of individual rights on the EU level that 
can be asserted against public policy decisions on the national level. This structurally skews 
EU law in favour of individual rights, and, typically, against collective values that have been 
democratically agreed upon on the national level, which may range from social protection,
51
 
communitarian ideas of justice,
52
 health protection
53
 or consumer protection.
54
 The centrality 
of individual rights in the EU order has led Weiler to suggest that we can best understand 
individual rights as a mode of governance of the EU. This suggests that the role of individual 
rights serves not only to secure the objectives of the EU, but also to prevent contestation of its 
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values. The legal order created by EU law in fact piggybacks on the domestic constitutional 
order, and employs domestic judicial institutions to enforce the primacy of individual rights 
derived from EU law where they clash with domestic norms of public policy.
55
  
 
More often than not, these individual rights are economic in nature, such as the free 
movement provisions. In a recent example, the Scottish policy to introduce a minimum price 
per unit of alcohol to limit alcohol addiction was rejected by the Court with reference to the 
individual right of producers of alcohol to be able to effectively compete on the Scottish 
alcohol market.
56
 The way in which the Court makes sense of the clash between such an 
individual right and a norm of public policy – through the principle of proportionality – 
betrays an additional structural bias in favour of the former. In a number of cases, domestic 
policy choices, such as the fight against alcohol addition,
57
 or the right to strike,
58
 or norms 
governing the availability of pharmacies in rural areas,
59
 have been invalidated because they 
restrict the individual right to trade more than absolutely necessary. 
 
This bias in the Court’s methodology exacerbates the bias that is already implicit in EU law: it 
not only favours individual rights compared to collective values; but also favours economic 
values compared to non-economic values. This additional bias can be traced back to the EU’s 
understanding that its authority is sourced from granting individuals access to opportunities, 
values, or goods that cannot be made available by Member States alone.
60
 As Chalmers has 
argued, this has led to the excessive responsabilisation of the individual, which alienates them 
from an understanding of life as embedded in a range of daily activities that link to wider 
communities.
61
 EU law, then, is not only structurally blind to collective values by virtue of the 
way in which it has constructed its legal authority; it also understands the individual as an 
actor in isolation from collective values and the processes that generate those values.  
 
The problem with the EU’s structural focus on the individual as a disembedded subject is that 
it creates resistance. Such resistance might emerge where economic values trump cherished 
collective values,
62
 and where EU law is understood as pitting mobile EU citizens against 
immobile EU citizens in access to jobs or welfare structures. Whether these conflicts are 
empirically demonstrable or not is beside the point. The point is that such contestation finds 
no place within the EU: individualism, and the protection of individual rights, lies both at the 
conceptual and normative core of EU law. Contestation of these values is made practically 
impossible. Even where the EU possesses the legislative competences to overturn the status 
quo as decided in a ruling by the Court, this requires a majority of institutional support that is 
– on the domestic level – reserved for constitutional amendments, and, ultimately, can still be 
overturned by the Court with reference to its compatibility with the free movement 
provisions.
63
 What is left is a range of salient and highly politicised policy questions that can 
no longer be decided with reference to the needs and desires of those affected by them.  
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III.3 – Beyond uniformity 
 
The third site of contestation of the EU can be found where the EU is perceived to be 
insensitive to the identity of and the difference between its Member States. This type of 
contestation takes place in different forms, which all challenge the assumption of uniformity 
that is central to EU law. What underlies this challenge is the claim that certain questions that 
go to the identity or self-understanding of a community ought to be remain in the hands of 
that community. Crucially, this is not contestation of the process of integration as such. 
Rather, it is contestation of the way in which we ‘do’ integration, which leaves insufficient 
space for Member States to contest the instances where EU law is insensitive to a state’s self-
understanding or perceived identity.  
 
On the most structural level, this rejection can be traced in the process of differentiated 
integration. At the moment, only six Member States participate in all EU policies. All others 
having opted out of one or more policy areas.
64
 This differentiation can be explained by the 
fact that different policy questions are considered salient or controversial in different states. 
As Schimmelfennig, Leuffen, and Rittberger have highlighted, differentiated integration can 
in fact best be seen as an interaction between interdependence and politicisation
65
 While the 
former is a driver of integration, the latter is a brake on integration. In other words, the higher 
the policy interdependence between states in a certain policy area, the greater the desire for 
integration and cooperation (and the greater the cost of non-cooperation). Conversely, the 
higher the politicisation of a policy question, by which the authors mean the extent to which a 
policy question is considered salient in the domestic setting or tied to national identity, the 
higher the costs of integration, and the more resistance and contestation that integration will 
produce.
66
 It is not particularly complicated to understand the logic here: Member States are 
aware that cooperation in policy area X means that they will no longer be able to control the 
norms that govern that policy area. EU law, after all, will trump domestic political choices. If 
the domestic electorate – for cultural, social, political, or ethical reasons – thinks that a 
specific outcome in policy area X is crucial to their autonomy, identity, or self-understanding 
as a community, they are likely to resist integration in this policy domain.  
 
Other examples of this tension between uniformity and national self-understanding can be 
found throughout EU law. A recent example is the Hungarian referendum, which sought to 
resist a (lawful) decision to re-allocate refugees throughout the EU.
67
 The referendum 
question was phrased as follows: ‘’Do you want to allow the European Union to mandate the 
resettlement of non-Hungarian citizens to Hungary without the approval of the National 
Assembly?” The question was rejected by 98% of voters, albeit with only 44% turnout. The 
point, here, however, is not the outcome of the vote. The point is the way in which the 
question and debate were framed. The focus seems not to be the compulsory migrant quota, 
but the capacity of the EU to cause both identity and autonomy costs for Hungary without the 
approval of Hungarian parliament. What appears to be contested is less the substantive 
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decision of the EU, but rather its very capacity to make these specific type of decisions.
68
 A 
less dramatic example is the German Constitutional Court’s famous Lisbon ruling, in which it 
offered an account of national constitutional identity that suggested that certain policy areas 
where so central to the identity of the German state that the self-determination and autonomy 
of its citizens would be irreparably affected if they were ever decided on the European level, 
and without explicit consent of the German parliament.
69
 While the language employed in 
these two examples might be radically different, the message is the same: the EU is incapable 
of being sensitive to claims of identity or self-understanding of a community. In consequence, 
the EU ought to not intervene is the policy domains linked to those claims.  
 
This critique is, in fact, also immanent to EU law. On this account, EU law lacks the 
expressive capacity that we associate with national law. EU law is considered to be 
insufficiently sensitive to the social context within which it operates, and does not reflect the 
cultural, social, or symbolic traits of its environment.
70
 Chalmers, for example, suggests that 
the EU’s “concern to secure authority by legislating better to realise certain shared activities 
leads to expertise heavily influencing both the incidence of EU law and to a disregard of those 
activities which link daily life experiences to wider processes of identity formation”.71 The 
result is that the subjects of EU law, that is, its citizenry, experiences EU law as something 
that, to put it as simple as possible, misses the point. EU law articulates an idea of community, 
of the individual and her life that is shallow, one-dimensional and not particularly 
emancipatory.
72
 What lacks, then, both in the way we integrate and in the DNA of EU law, is 
space for identity, difference and contestation. This lack of space, it is argued, is the source of 
much of the recent contestation of the EU, and can, once again, be traced back to the reliance 
on law to secure (uncontestable) functional objectives. It can also, of course, be traced back to 
the principle of congruence, in so far that integration is understood to lead to irreparable loss 
of the electorates’ capacity to affect policy change. 
 
III.4 – Brexit and structural contestation of the EU 
 
Brexit can be understood as the culmination of the above types of contestation. It shows, 
simply put, that substantive contestation of any specific part of the integration process can 
transform into structural contestation of the edifice of integration as such, when contestation 
cannot be institutionalised or internalised. Contestation as such, as Dahrendorf has long 
argued, can be productive and legitimising forces for a polity.
73
 Substantive political conflict 
over, say, the conditions of austerity, the limits to free movement or the possible solutions to 
the refugee crisis need not be problematic for the EU. It is not something that will inevitably 
lead to the end of integration, or cause problems in the management of interdependence. More 
than that, allowing citizens that are affected by these policy choices to contest them is healthy 
for a polity: it makes the polity sensitive to discontent, it engenders passion, channels 
discontent towards the centre, offers institutional mediation of conflict, legitimizes the 
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eventual policy orientation and its enforcement, and bolsters the authority of the polity.
74
 
Political conflict at once “articulates the presence of dominance and problematizes it”,75 
allowing citizens to understand policy orientations as contingent, and incentivizing their 
engagement within the institutional machinery of the polity.  
 
But for conflict and contestation to be productive forces, these forces require careful 
institutionalization, which entails, at the very least, substantive space for policy contestation, 
an institutional monopoly on voice, and a structural sensitivity for newly-emerging 
discontent.
76
 If contestation can be productive for a polity when it is properly institutionalized, 
it is lethal for a polity without such institutionalization. The EU – and more specifically Brexit 
– shows why that is the case. To put it as simple as possible, without the possibility of 
contestation within a polity, discontent spills over as contestation of the polity.  
 
Analysis of electoral data after the Brexit vote shows a remarkable cleavage between a group 
of citizens who fare well under (or are used to) conditions of global competition and global 
opportunities,
77
 and those who feel that they have lost out because of the process of 
globalisation – be it economically, socially, or culturally. 78  This new cleavage, between 
internationalists and nationalists, was largely mirrored in the French presidential elections of 
2017, and has been a prominent theme in elections throughout the EU. Arguably, the 
emergence of this cleavage results (at least partially) from EU law because EU law prevents it 
from being articulated. On the EU level, a commitment to ‘internationalism’, in the form of 
the free movement of factors of production, citizens, and austerity, is constitutionalised. That 
means that it cannot be altered without the unanimous consent of twenty-eight governments, 
their parliaments, and their electorates. To put this point as starkly as possible, a 50.1% 
majority of Maltese parliament can resist any changes to this commitment to internationalism 
even if all other Member States would want to. 
 
On the national level, contestation of that commitment is equally difficult. Given the 
incapacity of one government to change this commitment, national political parties have an 
obvious incentive to prevent its politicisation. Even if they are elected on the back of a 
promise to change the conditions of free movement (or austerity, migration law, state aid 
rules), they will not be able to uphold those promises – as Tsipras most recently 
demonstrated.
79
 The result has been a thorough depoliticisation of the commitment to 
internationalism. And so while the centre-left parties throughout the EU may be 
uncomfortable with the liberal premise of the internal market; and the centre-right parties may 
disagree with the rules on free movement of persons; neither has meaningfully contested those 
core substantive principles governing the process of integration. Parties on the extreme left 
and right, on the other hand, have a much easier sell. Whether it is Mélanchon or Le Pen, the 
premise is simple: only by leaving the EU will we be able to control economic policy or 
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migration policy in a way that is sensitive to what the affected citizens want from it.
80
 In other 
words, the absence of space for contestation within the EU caused a translation of substantive 
contestation of a certain policy orientation into structural contestation of the EU as such. 
 
Brexit, then, as the culmination of decades of contestation of the EU, reveals a number of 
things about EU law. First, it shows the dark side of the current method of managing 
interdependence. The reliance on law throughout the process of integration is justified by its 
capacity to prevent Member State from taking decisions that impose costs on their 
neighbours. As such, it secures the principle of congruence: Member State B, whose citizens 
have not been consulted about a decision made by Member State A, won’t have to face the 
costs of that decision. At the same time, it is structurally blind to the active version of the 
principle of congruence, whereby those citizens affected by a decision ought to be able to 
change it. In the EU, this is structurally impossible. This dark side of EU law causes 
substantive contestation of a particular norm in EU law to spill over into structural 
contestation of the whole edifice of integration. As Peter Mair and Ronald Dahl have put it, 
without possibility of opposition and contestation within the EU, dissatisfaction quickly 
translates as opposition to and contestation of the EU.
81
 Ronald Dahl, in fact, is almost 
prophetic when, in 1965, he projects a new type of structural contestation that emerges when 
salient political questions are managed rather than politically contested.
82
 
 
If the first lesson from Brexit is that contestation is to internalized if it is not to translate into 
structural opposition to the EU, the second lesson is that law cannot be central in that 
process.
83
 The current conditions of integration, in particular in the interdependence in 
Schengen and EMU, has created a perfect storm, whereby the policy domains in which 
Member States are now interdependent are exactly those that are most salient domestically. 
The EU’s policy orientation in these areas is bound to create contestation and conflict, yet is 
still managed through law, which is structurally blind to such contestation and makes the EU 
politically unresponsive. More than that, the above sections has highlighted an immanent 
critique of EU law, which is perceived to have little expressive capacity, to disembed the 
individual from the social context within which she operates, and to struggle to articulated 
forms of solidarity.
84
 In the current conditions of integration, then, we must rethink the role of 
EU law as the glue that structures the interdependence between Member States. The following 
sections will discuss the institutional preconditions for the EU to transition from a polity that 
is fundamentally based on securing congruence through law to one that is more sensitive to 
political claims and the capacity of the EU’s electorate to affect policy outcomes. 
 
 
IV: Institutionalising Integration 
 
The two stories of European integration recounted in the previous sections suggest that if we 
want to analyse the EU’s current predicament, we ought to think of how to institutionalise 
contestation in conditions of interdependence. The question that is central to the legitimacy 
and stability of the EU, then, has changed from 1957. If in 1957 the question was how to 
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manage interdependence between Member States; the question today is how to manage 
contestation in conditions of interdependence.  
 
The first section to this paper has suggested that the principle of congruence might offer some 
insights. That principle articulates a standard of legitimacy: those affected by a certain 
decision ought to be the ones making that decision. If we think this through in the European 
context it can mean one of two things. On the one hand, it can justify the creation of 
instruments that prevent State A from taking a decision that affects the citizens in State B 
(who have not been able to participate in making that decision). This first option, which 
focuses on the prevention of externalities created by domestic decisions, is central in the way 
in which the EU currently operates, and is central to the functioning of EU law. On the other 
hand, the principle of congruence could also be attained by scaling up the level at which a 
certain decision is made.
85
 This would suggest that a decision that affects citizens in States A 
and B ought to be made collectively, while decisions that affect only the citizens in State A 
can be make domestically. This second route, of course, is implemented in the EU through the 
demarcation of competences and the institutional structure that legislates in the areas 
transferred to the EU. What the second section of this paper has argued, in the simplest terms, 
is that the centrality of law in the functioning of the EU (the first option) has not left sufficient 
space for the second option, which is premised on political and institutional cooperation. The 
arrival in quick succession of the three major crises of the EU’s history have highlighted, 
moreover, that using law only gets us to a certain point. Law lacks the capacity to resolve the 
tension between interdependence and independence in a manner that is legitimate and 
authoritative where it operates in isolation from political contestation.  
 
The current conditions of integration, typified by ever more interdependence in policy 
domains that are highly salient and politicised, are likely to engender more and more 
contestation in and of the EU. Without changes to the way in which such contestation is 
institutionalised, it is likely to spill over from a substantive domain into a structural 
contestation of the EU as a whole. Ultimately, interdependence cannot be managed without 
remaining sensitive to the claims of those that are faced with its consequences. How can we 
rethink the way in which we manage interdependence under the current social and political 
conditions of wide-spread contestation? Several scholars have (more or less explicitly) 
engaged with this question. They fall in three camps. In the first camp we find those that 
argue for contestation of the EU through law. The logic, here, is that much of the power of the 
EU, and its incapacity to institutionalise contestation, emerges through the force of its legal 
order (section 1). In the second camp we find those that argue for contestation of law. They 
argue for an explicit (and legally enshrined) retrenchment of the power of EU law, and a 
strengthening of the power of political actors within the existing institutional framework of 
the EU (section 2). The third camp suggests that contestation in conditions of interdependence 
inevitably requires substantive policy decisions to be taken beyond the level of the nation 
state. What requires changing, then, is the way in which decisions are made in the EU. In 
short, this argument suggests that the EU needs to become more sensitive to the substantive 
policy claims and substantive contestation in the way it takes decisions (section 3).  
 
IV.1 – Contestation through law? 
 
The first way in which the space for contestation could be created is through legal means. 
Much of the depoliticising nature of the EU and the inability to contest its values comes from 
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the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy. Limiting the reach of these doctrines, the 
thinking goes, can carve out more space for contestation of the substantive orientation of the 
integration project on the national level. The crucial actors in this vision of resistance to the 
EU are national courts. The doctrines of direct effect and supremacy are crucially dependent 
on national courts: without the latter’s capacity to restrain domestic political decisions and 
overturn those decisions when they conflict with EU law, EU law loses much of its 
effectiveness. 
 
Several authors have suggested that the effects of EU law ought to be resisted by national 
courts. Menéndez, for example, has argued that the national constitutional courts ought to 
more actively resist the dismantling of the principles of the Rechtsstaat in the aftermath of the 
Euro-crisis;
86
 while Davies has argued that the British contestation of the consequences of 
free movement could (even should) have been articulated by the judicial branch.
87
 More 
assertiveness by the judicial branch in channelling contestation, the argument goes, would 
prevent substantive contestation on a specific element of EU law from spilling over in 
structural contestation of the integration project as such.
88
 In simpler terms, then, articulating 
contestation through law would make EU law more sensitive to the effect it has on certain 
salient political questions on the national level.  
 
Instances of domestic judicial resistance against EU law are increasing, and, crucially, are 
often justified with explicit reference to the need to re-assert a balance between the power of 
law and the power of politics in the process of integration.
89
 The Bundesverfassungsgericht 
has articulated, in a range of decisions,
90
 a limit to the authority of EU law that is explicitly 
premised on the need to preserve the capacity of German representative institutions to decide 
on certain core policy questions that are closely tied to the redistributive and cultural identity 
of the German state.
91
 In Ajos, the Danish supreme court argued that judge-made general 
principles of EU law – in this case the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of age – 
cannot displace conflicting Danish law (that is, the supremacy of EU law does not extend to 
include such general principles).
92
 The logic, here, is, once again, that the Danish parliament 
has never consented with the general principle of non-discrimination based on age, and that 
principle could, therefore, not be of use in displacing conflicting Danish labour law. The 
underlying logic suggests that the real issue was the redistributive effect that the principle 
could have in Denmark – and that such redistributive effects must necessarily be mediated 
through political processes.  
 
Finally, the Italian constitutional court, in Taricco, had to deal with a complex question 
relating to the statutory limitation on VAT fraud. In the answer to a previous preliminary 
reference, the Court had understood this limitation period to be part of procedural criminal 
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law, while under Italian law, it is considered part of substantive criminal law.
93
 In a somewhat 
surprising move, the Italian constitutional court argued that the rules governing statutory 
limitation periods are part of the Italian constitutional identity, which would, in turn, exempt 
them from being displaced by conflicting EU law. What is of interest, for us, is not so much 
whether it could plausibly be argued that these specific rules are indeed part of Italy’s 
constitutional identity. More crucial is the assertion that anything (be it an entire policy area, 
an internal administrative rule or specific provision of criminal law) that is considered to fall 
under the header ‘national constitutional identity’ is thereby immediately immune to 
displacement by virtue of EU law. The legal basis for this assertion is Article 4 (2) TEU, 
which explicitly highlights that “the Union shall respect (…) national identities, inherent in 
the fundamental structures, political and constitutional” of the Member States. The eagerness 
with which national constitutional courts have used this provision to ringfence certain 
elements of national law and even entire policy areas from EU interference is not surprising. 
It offers, after all, both a method to contest the power of EU law (by way of suspension of the 
very premise of the power of EU law) and a language that justifies such displacement in 
terms of fundamental values or virtues of a politically constituted community. What follows, 
then, is a vision of integration whereby national courts ensure that certain salient 
redistributive, moral, cultural or social preferences can be decided on the national level 
without risk being displaced by EU law. Implicitly, this amounts to a wider claim about the 
limit of legal authority: certain decisions can only legitimately be made if decided through a 
process of political contestation and mediation.  
 
EU law, in this way, becomes automatically and structurally sensitive to instances of 
substantive contestation. The argument presented in this section, then, could have softened the 
austerity drive in Greece by insisting on certain social standards, could have prevented the 
reformulation of collective labour agreements in Sweden and Finland, allowed Hungary to 
suspend its obligations under the relocation obligation, or the UK to decide on the conditions 
under which its public services could operate. The main advantage of contestation through 
law, then, is that it works: EU law simply cannot enforce its norms where the domestic order 
suspends its application, which can offer breathing space for the domestic political system to 
articulate alternative values.
94
 There are, of course, evident drawbacks to this approach – both 
in terms of the institutional capacity of national courts in articulating policy contestation and 
in temrs of the externalities of such contestation on the other Member States and their 
citizens.   
 
IV.2 – Contestation of law? 
 
A different approach that would make the EU more sensitive to contestation of its values is 
one that explicitly challenges the role of law, and attempts to reassert the primacy of the 
political institutions in the way in which the EU is run. As Scharpf, one of the proponents of 
this route, summarises: “the rationale of the rules suggested is to enlarge, at the same time, the 
action spaces of national and European political processes and to reduce the constraints 
imposed by non-political domination”.95 On this view, a double approach is required. First, it 
requires an explicit retrenchment of the role of law in the integration process. Authors such as 
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Scharpf and Grimm have called for this and argued that EU law needs to be 
‘deconstitutionalised’ and ‘repoliticised’.96 What they mean by this is that, at the moment, due 
to the principles of supremacy and direct effect, certain values enshrined in the EU treaties 
cannot possibly be displaced.
97
 This critique is mainly directed at the EU’s ‘economic 
constitution’. The free movement provisions, in a way, have constitutionalised a commitment 
to globalisation that can be resisted neither by national political action (which would be illegal 
under EU law) nor by action on the European level (because of the limited competence 
catalogue or heterogeneity of policy preferences that inhibits consensus).
98
 The solution 
offered, by these authors, is not to contest the power of law through resistance by judicial 
actors. Instead, they argue for a reconceptualization of the role of the EU law norms, 
presumably either by scrapping policy orientations from the Treaty and listing them in 
secondary legislation, which can more easily be amended, by explicitly highlighting that 
limitations in secondary legislation can affect primacy Treaty provisions, or lowering voting 
tresholds to allow for political rejection of a Court ruling.
99
  
 
The explicit retrenchment of the role of law is only the starting point, however. The second 
part of this approach sees to the strengthening of control of political actors over the contours, 
direction, and intensity of integration. While commentators differ in where to locate this new 
power – ranging from Council to national parliaments – they argue that only by empowering 
national political actors can the EU remain sufficiently sensitive to the needs and desires of 
the electorate. The implicit assumption is that only on the national level can we find a political 
sphere that is sufficiently sophisticated so as to be able to mediate between alternative and 
conflicting policy orientations. In essence, this boils down to the normative claim that 
interdependence between Member States can only be managed legitimately by remaining 
sensitive to the independence of those Member States.
100
  
 
The exact institutions that should benefit from this recalibration of political power is unclear. 
Some authors suggest that we should focus on national parliaments. Chalmers, for example, 
argues that national parliaments are best placed to police the democratic authority of EU 
action.
101
 This suggest that EU legislative action must remain conditional upon a majority of 
national parliaments consenting to it, and would even allow individual national parliaments to 
suspend the application of EU law where EU law is considered to impose more costs than 
benefits.
102
 What underlies this vision of political authority for the EU is an insight, shared by 
authors such as Bellamy and Bickerton,
103
 that the national political space is the only one 
sufficiently sophisticated to allow for meaningful political expression by citizens. Ensuring 
that the political power on the European level remains conditional upon national consent, 
then, is a way of ensuring that the domestic electorate can contest and can affect policy 
outcomes that determine their lives. Other authors, such as Scharpf, argue that the most 
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appropriate forum for political control of the EU’s policy orientation is the Council. His 
proposal is based on a number of ‘groundrules’ that serve to simultaneously protect (political) 
minorities and accommodate diversity, while preventing the creation of a range of veto-
players that leads to institutional paralysis.
104
 In other words, Scharpf calls for protection of 
the autonomy of Member States, and their capacity to contest and resist norms emanating 
from the EU; but at the same time understands that the interdependence between states 
requires a more flexible system for decision-making. His solution to this conundrum is to 
institutionalise the role of opt-outs.
105
 As a rule, in Scharpf’s model, Member States should be 
allowed to opt-out of EU legislation, unless the possibility of opt-outs is excluded by a 
qualified majority of Member States.  
 
This second route towards making the EU more structurally sensitive to contestation of its 
values and norms lies in decreasing the hold of law over the process of integration, and 
shifting power towards domestic political actors (be they representative or executive), whose 
authority is, crucially, premised on the consent of their electorates. The logic, here, is that by 
bolstering the power of national actors within the EU’s decision-making process, the EU will 
become more sensitive to forms of contestation that emerge throughout its Member States.  
 
IV.3 – Contestation in conditions of interdependence 
 
Under the current social and political conditions of integration, typified by vast redistribution 
and deep interdependence between states, it is difficult to think of ways in which to 
institutionalise contestation. The proposals discussed in the two previous sections attempt to 
do so by carving out more space for political actors on the national level, and by somehow 
allowing these national actors to opt-out or suspend the application of EU law where it 
conflicts with salient political choices on the national level. This way, it is thought, the 
integration process becomes structurally sensitive to emerging discontent, and substantive 
contestation does not spill over into structural contestation of the EU. In a way, then, this new 
flexibility to suspend EU law strengthens rather than weakens the legitimacy and stability of 
the EU.  
 
Arguably, the problem with this approach is that it is based on a paradox. The explicit 
objective of the approach is to ensure that certain decisions (typically those of a distributive, 
identity, or cultural nature) can be made, altered, and controlled by the national electorate. 
However, the attempt to achieve this objective by bolstering the political control of national 
actors has an important side effect, in so far as it irrevocably decreases the capacity of the 
electorate of their neighbouring state to do exactly the same.
106
 In situations of 
interdependence, in other words, the capacity of national electorates to affect the outcome of a 
decision (or change it) are inextricably linked. A Hungarian decision that prevents the entry of 
refugees does have an effect on its neighbouring states; a ruling by the German Constitutional 
Court that defines debt relief for Greece illegal does have an effect on Greece’s internal policy 
choices; a Finnish decision to set aside Viking with reference to its fundamental commitment 
to the right to strike does have an effect on companies in Estonia; and a rejection by the Greek 
population of certain effects of austerity does have an effect on the other Member States and 
citizens in the Eurozone. Making the EU sensitive to national resistance, in other words, does 
not appear to solve the fundamental question of how to institutionalise contestation while 
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remaining sensitive to the principle of congruence, which suggests that all affected by a 
decision ought to be the ones making that decision, and, implicitly, that those affected by a 
decision ought to be able to alter it. More than that, allowing more scope for national political 
actors exponentially increases their capacity to impose costs on their neighbours – which is, of 
course, the very problem that the integration process attempts to solve.  
 
If we take the principle of congruence as the starting point, on the other hand, we can begin to 
understand the changes that are required to make the EU structurally sensitive to contestation 
under conditions of interdependence. These changes, it is argued, are threefold.
107
 First, the 
principle of congruence requires that policy decisions made on the European level can 
actually be changed. At the moment, the policy orientations in areas as diverse as state aid, 
employment policy, industrial policy, monetary policy or migration policy are constitutionally 
entrenched, and would require Treaty revision for any changes. As Scharpf has put it, this 
leads to a situation of, “politicisation without the possibility of autonomous policy choices, 
[which] is more likely to produce frustration, alienation, apathy or rebellion rather than 
democratic legitimation.”108 What is needed, then, is the capacity of the electorate to alter the 
EU’s policy preferences throughout all its policy domains. This will not only ensure that those 
preferences are democratically legitimated and secure the principle of congruence, but also 
imbue the EU’s electorate with the dynamism and passion that comes from simply being able 
to change things.
109
 Opening up the EU’s policy direction to contestation requires, as Scharpf 
calls is, a ‘deconstutionalisation’ of the Treaty, whereby the direction is not be legally 
ringfenced from political contestation, but decided through a process of political contestation. 
This requires stripping the Treaty to its bones: no longer will it detail policy orientations or 
policy objectives. These will be up for grabs through the decision-making process. Instead, 
the Treaty will detail the institutional configuration of the EU, as well as the fundamental 
rights that ensure equal and free participation of all Europeans to the decision-making 
process.  
 
The second precondition in securing the principle of congruence in conditions of 
interdependence is to ensure that conflict is institutionalised along functional rather than 
national lines. This is crucial for the contestation of policy preferences to be a productive 
rather than a destructive force. At the moment, contestation in the EU is played out along 
national lines: the conflict between those in favour of austerity and those against is not 
institutionalised substantively, but is institutionalised as a number of creditor states against a 
number of debtor states. These national cleavages obscure the underlying functional 
complexity and internal differentiation, and are sticky: they follow from the assumption that 
political mandates are given in national general elections.
110
 And so Tsipras and Merkel both 
come to the table with a strong mandate that requires opposing policy outcomes, which cannot 
– because of the interdependence between states – be realised simultaneously.111 It is not 
difficult to understand why that makes conflict in the EU at the moment such a destructive 
force: given that we cannot both accept and reject austerity, some Member States (and the 
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voice of their electorate) is simply side-lined. Their ability to affect the conditions under 
which they live, then, dissolves.  
 
A way to get past these national cleavages is to attempt to construct functional cleavages. 
These cleavages are traditionally found on the national level, and offer conflicting policy 
orientations on the basis of functional differentiation. The traditional cleavages can be based 
on geography, age, religion, class, or political ideology.
112
 What such functional cleavages 
would allow us to do on the transnational level, is to understand what all citizens affected by a 
policy choice in EMU, Schengen, or the internal market want as a collectivity. Just as there 
will be Greeks in favour of austerity and Germans opposing it, so there will be a split between 
citizens who are in favour and against globalisation, that win or lose because of free 
movement, that oppose or support the EU’s social pillar, the EU’s treatment of refugees, 
GMOs, or the EU’s approach to combating piracy. The creation of transnational functional 
cleavages has the potential to significantly bolster the democratic legitimacy of the EU, as it 
allows all citizens affected by a certain decision to be part of making that decision, and, if 
necessary, to amend it. It is not a coincidence that Derrida and Habermas saw the 
transnational protests against the war in Iraq – simultaneously taking place in Madrid, Paris, 
London, Berlin and Rome – as immensely meaningful: this was perhaps the first articulation 
of a transnational cleavage that could genuinely legitimize transnational action.
113
 Crucially, 
the creation of transnational cleavages on the European level would allow us to engage with a 
cleavage that the Member States have struggled to internalize, which is the one that pits those 
in favour of globalization and free movement against those who fear its economic, social, or 
cultural dislocating effect. As we have seen, the inability of Member States to internalize this 
cleavage has greatly enhanced the appeal of the fringes of domestic politics.  
 
The conceptual and practical difficulties in moving from a system based on national cleavages 
to a system based on functional cleavages are, evidently, many.
114
 As Bartolini has argued, 
the productive institutionalization of conflict requires a level of sophistication and centre 
formation that is currently absent on the European level.
115
 Fostering open conflict in the 
absence of strong institutional structures is more likely to lead to political rupture than to 
legitimate policy discussions.
116
 This leads us to the third precondition in securing the 
principle of congruence on the European level. It would require radical institutional changes. 
For one, it would mean that (something akin to) the EP becomes the primary site for 
contestation, and has the monopoly on voice in the management of that contestation.
117
 Such a 
monopoly on voice is necessary to ensure that discontent gets directed towards a single site 
that can mediate it. This, in turn, presupposes the creation of Europe-wide electoral lists for 
the EP elections (something that is currently discussed as an option for the vacant UK seats), 
and the creation of genuine transnational parties that contest the elections with their own 
vision for the EU, each with their own agenda and candidate for the presidency of the 
Commission. It would also entail a massive shift in power away from the Council to the 
benefit of the EP, and the generation of a culture of contestation (rather than consensus) 
within the EP.
118
 The EP and Commission would relate to each other like national parliaments 
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relate to the national government. The latter would reflect the majorities in the former, and the 
former will hold the latter accountable. The Council, as a representation of the Member 
States, would be reformed as a European Senate, in which each state holds the same number 
of seats, and which votes by simple majority. This would lead to a system whereby functional 
cleavages dominate the policy discourse, and Europe’s citizens can partake in the creation of 
the rules that bind them in a way that reflects their equal status. It would, ultimately, allow the 
EU to legitimately and democratically answer the EU’s current issues: how to deal with its 
borders, how to redistribute resources, and how to deal with Brexit. At the moment, the 
closest we get to understanding what citizens actually want from the EU on these issues is 
from Eurobarometer, which is perhaps an even more damning indictment of the state of 
European democracy than the low turn-out for EP elections.  
 
The institutional reconfiguration towards an EU that can answer the basic political questions 
of our times also presupposes a constitutional framework that consists of institutional and 
administrative rules, and enumerates certain democratic principles and fundamental values 
that are not open for contestation.
119
 These suggestions might sound unfeasible and to push us 
towards a path of a federal EU. At the same time, it is the only path that can ensure that the 
substance of what the EU does remains sensitive to what citizens want the EU to do. Only by 
becoming sensitive to the functional cleavages that divide the EU’s electorates can the EU 
secure the principle of congruence while maintaining the complex web of interdependence as 
it currently exists.
120
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This article has highlighted a tension at the heart of the integration process. On the one hand, 
it is committed to managing the interdependence between states in a way that prevents 
conflict between them. On the other hand, the EU is increasingly criticised for the substantive 
choices that it makes in managing this interdependence, and for its inability to institutionalise 
the ensuing contestation. It was argued that the reason for this increase in contestation lies in 
how we ‘do’ integration, that is, how the EU attempts to manage the interdependence between 
its members. The EU has relied predominantly on law – which serves to depoliticise policy 
questions and tie national actors to a centrally decided policy orientation. As EU law’s reach 
is extended into more salient policy domains – which distribute resources, or articulate a 
particular vision of community and the individual – EU law struggles to secure legitimate 
policy outcomes. What is more, without the possibility to contest such choices, contestation 
that starts in a certain policy area risks spilling over into a contestation of the process of 
integration as such, as we saw with Brexit.  
 
The starting point for understanding this dynamic is the principle of congruence. This 
principle suggests that the citizens (or states) affected by a decision ought to play a part in 
making that decision. This serves to prevent the illegitimate imposition of costs by a decision 
in State A on its neighbouring states; and to ensure that those affected by a decision remain in 
a position to alter it. As the process of integration has progressed, the EU has focused more 
and more on the former, and forgotten about the latter. The capacity of Member States to 
decide on salient political questions with reference to the preferences of their electorate has 
progressively decreased and is progressively governed by the constraints imposed by EU law. 
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At the same time, it has become impossible for the citizens affected by a certain EU policy to 
alter it. This makes the EU structurally insensitive to the discontent that it generates. 
 
Under the current conditions of integration – characterised by vast redistributive practices, 
and a complex web of interdependence in the most salient of policy domains – the EU must 
be much more sensitive to the discontent that it generates. As Azoulai reminds us, integration 
is ultimately about making visible, solidifying, and eventually institutionalising the myriad 
relationships between citizens within and across borders, whereby “the recognition of 
interconnectedness is the precondition for mutual trust”.121 Law could be an instrument for 
this, but that would require a significant rethinking of its place in the process of integration.
122
 
More structurally, what is required is that the EU carve out a space where this mutual 
interconnectedness can be translated into political idea(l)s of how to live together. Before 
anything else, this presupposes a space for internal contestation within the EU as a way to 
prevent external contestation of the EU. Only by harnessing the preferences of its citizens can 
the EU sustain the complex web of interdependence in a way that is neither authoritarian nor 
executive. If Brexit is to serve as a lesson for the EU – rather than the beginning of a low and 
inexorable process of ever-increasing contestation – the EU must reimagine how it ‘does’ 
integration.  
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